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Civil Rights-STANDARDS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AFTER A FINDING OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ARE BASED ON AIMS OF TITLE VII-Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants the federal courts jurisdic-
tion in employment discrimination matters and sanctions orders of affirm-
ative relief where equitable.' This relief, usually in the form of back pay
and injunctions, 2 may be awarded upon a finding of intentional,3 discrimi-
natory4 labor practices. Being equitable remedies, however, the courts have
given numerous and conflicting interpretations as to when such affirmative
relief should be awarded or denied.5 The prior history of Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody' typifies the inconsistencies in this area. The case was a class
action under Title VII by former and present employees of Albemarle
Paper Company.7 The class, after following the designated administrative
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974). The source of the congres-
sional power exercised in Title VII is the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Under
this clause, Congress may regulate not only racial discrimination but any discrimination that
affects interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
Rav. 1109 (1971); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under The Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430 (1965).
2. If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Backpay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the Commission. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974) (addi-
tions from 1972 amendment italicized).
3. From the beginning "intentional" has been construed to mean not accidental. See 110
CONG. REc. 12723-24 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); Comment, Backpay for Employ-
ment Discrimination Under Title VI-Role of the Judiciary in Exercising its Discretion, 23
CATHOLIc U.L. REV. 525, 531-35 (1974). The courts have almost unanimously concurred in
this definition. See, e.g., Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); Kober
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); United Papermakers, Local 189 v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Contra, Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
4. An employment practice is racially discriminatory when grounded on the basis of race
or color as opposed to job qualifications. 110 CONG. REc. 7247 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Case).
5. Compare Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974), with Kober v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
6. 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
7. The plant employees' labor union, Halifax Local No. 425, was a co-petitioner.
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procedures,' filed for an injunction against Albemarle's alleged unlawful
employment practices. Backpay was not requested until after several years
of discovery and motions. The allegations attacked the company's senior-
ity system and its requirement of a high school diploma and passing of two
tests for entry into the skilled production lines?
The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ordered (1)
that seniority be computed on a plant-wide basis as opposed to an individ-
ual line basis to prevent blacks from being "locked in" to inferior jobs,"0
(2) that the high school diploma requirement be dropped for lack of relev-
ance to job performance, and (3) that the testing not be enjoined for it had
been related to job performance by an expert's validation. Backpay was
refused because the company had shown no bad faith" and the demand
for backpay five years after the institution of the suit had substantially
prejudiced the defendants." On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals 3 affirmed the order to implement a plant-wide seniority system and
abolish the high school diploma requirement. The court reversed the re-
mainder of the district court decree and ordered an injunction against the
use of Albemarle's employment tests and awarded backpay.1
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 5 the Supreme Court attempted to end
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974).
9. The allegations stated that until 1964, blacks were restricted to the lower skilled and
lower paying job lines. In 1964, transfers by blacks to other lines were allowed, but kept to a
minimum by the testing requirement (based on national norms without regard to the needs
of the specific job) and the high school diploma requirement (admitted by Albemarle to be
no indication of the quality of workers). In 1968, a seniority system was established which
computed seniority on the basis of the time spent on the individual line as opposed to the
whole plant. The former black-only lines were tacked to the bottom of the white lines thereby
"locking in" blacks at the bottom of each line. Four months before the trial in the district
court, Albemarle engaged an expert to "validate" its testing procedure by making it more
predictive of job performance. 95 S. Ct. at 2367-68, 2375-78.
10. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L.
Rav. 1260 (1967).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 2368. This finding was premised on the company's recent adjustments
aimed at alleviating present discrimination on its own initiative. Moreover, the state of the
law as to the legality of its practices was so unsettled that the company had no basis to
evaluate its own program.
12. Albemarle claimed that if it had known from the beginning that backpay was being
requested by the plaintiffs, it would have sought an earlier determination of its rights by the
district court. Id.
13. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
14. The testing was enjoined on the ground that Albemarle had not shown that the tests
were job-related. Backpay was awarded because there was no circumstance present that
compelled its denial. Id. at 140, 142.
15. 95 S. Ct. 2362. The decision as to the applicable law regarding backpay was unanimous.
Justice Blackmun concurred but criticized some of the decision's dicta on backpay and
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the use of conflicting standards in the areas of backpay awards and em-
ployment testing. 6 In establishing its own standard to be employed in the
awarding of backpay, the Court specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit's
rule that backpay must be awarded unless special circumstances compel
its denial. 7 Also rejected was the district court's reasoning that the good
faith of an employer requires the denial of backpay. Backpay is aimed at
remedying the consequences of the discriminatory actions and preventing
future violations rather than punishing the offending employer for bad
faith.'8 Albemarle insisted that the awarding of backpay was within the
sound discretion of the district court and should be based solely on equita-
ble standards. While agreeing that the district courts may balance equita-
ble considerations in ordering backpay awards,"9 the Supreme Court
stressed that this discretion must be exercised in accordance with the basic
statutory intent and purpose of Title VII.2
The intent of Congress in Title VII was to foster prompt dismantling of
all barriers to equality and to make the injured parties whole.21 In
dissented as to the applicable standards for test validation. Chief Justice Burger concurred
in the finding of the law applicable to backpay but disagreed with its application by the
Court. He also dissented as to the decision on testing.
16. See note 17 infra, for examples of conflicts on backpay; note 29 infra, on problem areas
in test evaluation.
17. 95 S. Ct. at 2370. The Fourth Circuit's decision was based on an analogy to the award-
ing of attorneys' fees under Title VII where such fees are awarded to a successful plaintiff
unless special circumstances exist. 474 F.2d at 141-42. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th
Cir. 1973). The "special circumstances" test of the Fourth Circuit was only one of several tests
used by the lower courts in deciding if backpay should be awarded. See Williams v. General
Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
18. 95 S. Ct. at 2374. By disavowing the idea that backpay may be ordered as a punishment
for violators of Title VII, the Court avoided an argument by the employer that his seventh
amendment right to trial by jury had been violated. See note 23 infra.
19. [Ihe court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ-
ment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
backpay .... 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974) (emphasis added).
20. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (Cum. Supp., 1975), district courts have had discretion
in the awarding of backpay as they do in Title VII cases, but "the statutory purposes...
[have left] little room for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement." Mitchell
v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960).
21. The source of these two standards is the congressional debate over the 1972 amendment
to Title VII.
[Tihe Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and.
the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular
unlawful practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the conse-
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Albemarle, the awarding of backpay was found by the Court to be instru-
mental in implementing both congressional desires. The employer having
the knowledge that backpay may not be awarded and facing only the
possibility of an injunction would have little incentive to promptly exam-
ine his employment policies to ensure their fairness.22 However, knowledge
that backpay would normally be awarded in such a situation may spur the
dismantling of marginal practices. Moreover, in the majority of instances,
the major effect of the past discrimination is an economic injury causing
backpay to be the likely remedy to make the injured parties economically
whole.2 Therefore, although backpay is an equitable remedy and not man-
datory as would be a normal award for damages, because of its statutory
mandate it should only be denied "for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes . . . [of Title VIII .'2'
This standard does not deny district courts their right to do equity, yet it
seems to create an implied presumption that backpay is due after a finding
of discrimination.25 What is accomplished at the minimum is that the
quences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored
to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
22. 95 S. Ct. at 2371.
23. Most courts say the awarding of backpay is compensatory; it restores the injured party
to the position he would have been in but for the discrimination. See 23 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv., supra note 3, at 528-31. The supreme Court's use of backpay is more expansive. It acts
as a deterrent as well as a reimbursement. 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72. This concept has been in the
background of many decisions but was not openly espoused until United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
Although there is little in the legislative history of Title VII to support their views, several
writers have searched for means to have greater monetary judgments awarded to the injured
party. This could be done, it is suggested, by giving compensatory damages in a tort action
for mental distress. See Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title
V!!, 54 VA. L. Rav. 491 (1968); 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1337 (1974). In applicable situations the
action might include a request for punitive damages. See Richards, Compensatory and Puni-
tive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603 (1973). Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), backpay is acknowledged to be
partly punitive in nature. If any one of these proposals for additional damages is adopted,
the seventh amendment's guarantee of trial by jury might alter significantly the procedure
presently used in Title VII cases. 95 S. Ct. at 2385 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
24. 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
25. The provision for backpay in Title VII was modeled after the backpay provision in the
National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). That provision declares it a
public policy to award backpay in order to make injured workers whole. See Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). As a result, the awarding of backpay in N.L.R.A. cases
becomes a matter of course. See NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
The Court assumed that Congress was aware of this practice when the backpay provision was
inserted in Title VII. Based on this assumption, the Court implicitly concluded that when
discrimination is found in Title VII cases, backpay should be presumptively awarded. 95 S.
Ct. at 2372-73.
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employer bears the heavy burden of showing that the aims of Title VII will
not be frustrated by the denial of backpay.
Albemarle's claim of substantial prejudice by the belated request for
backpay was remanded for further consideration in light of the new stan-
dard. A denial of backpay for this reason seems very unlikely. Albemarle
will have to show more than severe prejudice" since the new standard
directs the court's scrutiny to the effect a denial of backpay will have on
Title VII's purposes rather than the special circumstances of the employer.
Albemarle must convince the court that a denial of backpay for this reason
will not frustrate the aims of Title VII in addition to rebutting the usual
presumption that the employer should bear the loss arising from his dis-
criminatory practices.?
On the issue of the employment tests used by Albemarle,2 the Court
again found it desirable to set a standard under which each district court
could retain its discretion in granting affirmative relief (i.e., enjoining use
of the tests) while adhering to a common set of guidelines. The Court had
taken the first step in achieving such a result in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5
where the "business necessity" rule was established. Under this rule, if the
employer's tests are shown to be rationally related to valid business objec-
tives, the tests will be upheld as consistent with the statutory purposes of
Title VII? In Albemarle, the Court stated that whether a particular em-
26. Justice Marshall in his concurrence felt it would take very unusual circumstances for
backpay to be denied to a class. He felt the prejudice claim in Albemarle was probably not
sufficiently serious or unusual to deny backpay because evidence for determination of lost
wages was such that the computation would be simple. 95 S. Ct. at 2384.
27. Id. at 2375. This presumption is applied in all equity cases and is difficult for the
offending party to overcome. See Comment, Equal Employment Opportunity: The Back Pay
Remedy Under Title VH, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 379.
28. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1974).
29. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case also involved the use of tests to evaluate employees as
well as a high school diploma requirement. These were struck down as not demonstrably
related to job performance because no proper validation study had been performed. But a
conflict arose as to whether any standards for such a study were adopted by the Court. See
Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Employment Tests, 21 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 580
(1971) (asserting that a standard, in the form of guidelines set down by the EEOC, had been
adopted). Contra, Comment, The Georgia Power Case: Another Federal Agency Comes of
Age, or, "My God! Our Employer-Client's Testing Practices Are Being Challenged by the
EEOC?!," 57 MARQ. L. Ry. 515 (1974). In United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906
(5th Cir. 1973), the court adopted these guidelines as its measure of job-relatedness appar-
ently in deference to the Griggs decision.
30. 401 U.S. at 431.
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ployment test is a "business necessity" must be decided by reference to
the EEOC's guidelines for employers. 1 Although these guidelines are not
administrative "regulations" issued pursuant to formal procedures estab-
lished by Congress,3" they are "[t]he administrative interpretation[s] of
the Act by the enforcing agency [and are therefore] entitled to great
deference."3 These guidelines reflect the aims of Title VII more than other
available standards. 4 The lower courts in searching for a standard by
which employment tests could be judged often had the aims of Title VII
in mind but the standards used varied." Under this new standard, material
defects were found in Albemarle's attempt to show that its tests were job-
related. 6 The question whether an injunction against the continued use of
the tests should now be granted was remanded to the district court.37
It seems clear that the EEOC guidelines after Albemarle must be used
as the standard for establishing the business necessity of employment
tests. However, non-compliance with the standard is not fatal provided the
employer can show that the continued use of the tests will not frustrate
the aims of Title VII. Clearly the wise employer will attempt to protect
himself by following the guidelines. This is no easy task for an employer
due to the difficulty of understanding and the practical problems in apply-
31. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975).
32. Formal procedures involve public comment and scrutiny so as to prevent proposed
guidelines from being arbitrary. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun noted in their
dissents concerning the testing that since these were only guidelines and had not been scruti-
nized, to require slavish adherence would be an error. 95 S. Ct. 2388, 2390.
33. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
34. Comments within the EEOC's guidelines (29 C.F.R. § 1607. 1(a) (1975)) explicitly state
that the guidelines are to help create job tests that pronote efficiency and end employment
discrimination. They accomplish both these goals by insuring that the tests will be job-
related, thus constituting a "business necessity." See 57 MARQ. L. REv. 515, supra note 29,
for a strong criticism of these guidelines.
35. Compare Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974), with
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
36. The tests employed were found not to be sufficiently correlated to predict adequately
job performance. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975). The correlation method itself was too
subjective to be free from at least unconscious bias. Id. § 1607.5(b) (3)-(4). The employees who
took the tests were from the upper sections of their lines, and no factors were considered to
determine if the results from these tests would adequately predict what skills lower level jobs
would require. Id. § 1607.4(c)(1). Finally, out of 125 employees who took the tests, only four
were black while the population which would take the tests to be hired or transferred was
heavily black. Id. § 1607.5(b)(5).
37. The Court noted that in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.9 (1975), continued use of tests not fully
validated is allowable pending further validation. 95 S. Ct. at 2380. It also appeared from
the evidence that Albemarle may have sufficiently changed its testing procedure by the time
of the decision so that it would now be acceptable. These considerations are to be weighed
by the district court in light of the new standard on remand. 95 S. Ct. 2380.
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ing the guidelines. 8 Therefore, in future cases it will be particularly impor-
tant for courts to seriously consider the employer's showing that his non-
compliance does not defeat the purposes of Title VII.
T.A.L.
38. See notes 29 & 32 supra.
